STUDYING CHINESE
PHILOSOPHY:
TURN-OF-THE-CENTURY'S CHALLENGES
Chen Lai,
Department of Philosophy, Peking University
Translated and edited by Michel Masson and Kao Chia Chi,
Institut Ricci pour les études chinoises, Paris
published in "Revue Internationale de Philosophie"
Bruxelles, 2005, n°2, pp.181-198.
At this turn of the century, students of
Chinese philosophy are indeed faced with quite a number of problems and
challenges, indeed. This essay will discuss only one of these
challenges, and it is an old question: What is the content and scope of
an exposition of Chinese philosophy? How is the history of Chinese
philosophy similar or not to other scholarly approaches to the study of
Chinese thought in general?
***
The notion of "Chinese philosophy" was born in the twentieth century.
Likewise, the current notion of "Chinese philosophy" as an academic
field of study first appeared in the twentieth century. Today, after
100 years or so of development, the study of Chinese philosophy has
already led to very substantial achievements. Yet, at this turn of the
century, this academic discipline finds itself, in various ways and to
various degrees, under attack from several quarters around the world.
In view of these challenges, the need has arisen to reassess the
identity of Chinese philosophy and to take up its defence anew. But,
let us start from the beginning.
In 1918, Hu Shi (189?- ) published "An Outline of the History of
Chinese Philosophy."1 In his "Preface" to this book,
Cai Yuanpei ( - ) emphasized that any historian of Chinese philosophy
would have to deal with two major difficulties: sorting out genuine
texts and forged materials; and, deciding on the mode of exposition.
Regarding the latter, Cai Yuanpei wrote: "There has been no systematic
recording of classical Chinese learning. All we have are very
pedestrian accounts. If we wish to compose a systemic account of
classical learning, the studies of Antiquity are of no help, and we
have no other way but follow the criteria of histories of philosophy in
the West. In other words, only those who have studied the history of
western philosophy can determine the appropriate form of exposition."2
The history of philosophy is "history" indeed, and, of course, it
narrates the evolution of philosophy according to historical order.
But, by "mode of exposition" Cai Yuanpei meant much more: decisions
regarding content and scope, as well as the way Chinese materials
should be sorted out according to the architectonics of western
philosophy. Hence, in the very first pages of his book Hu Shi discussed
the definition of philosophy: "So far there has been no fixed
definition of philosophy, and, for the time being, I volunteer the
following. Let us call philosophy any study that is a fundamental
reflection on the important problems of human life and searches for a
fundamental solution." Hu Shi added: "Since the important problems of
human life are many, there are also many kinds of philosophical
questions," and he mentioned the following six: cosmology, logics and
epistemology, philosophy of life or ethics, philosophy of education,
political philosophy, and philosophy of religion. Hence, "a history of
philosophy is an exposition, according to historical periods and
schools, of the various ways by which men have studied and solved the
various philosophical problems."3 Central to Hu Shi's
definition of philosophy are the ultimate concerns of human life and,
as such, it could very well stand on its own; yet, it was very
difficult to distinguish it from the definition of religion. As to his
definition of a history of philosophy, it emphasized the "narration,"
it could be termed a narrative history of philosophy.
Hu Shi also addressed the issue of Chinese philosophy and world
philosophies:
One may roughly divide the various
philosophies into two branches: eastern and western philosophies. Each
branch can be further divided into two systems: Indian and Chinese in
the East, Greek and Jewish in the West. At the initial stage, each
system appeared quite independently; then, starting in the second
century B.C. the Jewish system joined the Greek one, and the outcome
was the philosophy of mediaeval Europe; meanwhile, the Indian system
joined the Chinese one, and the outcome was the philosophy of mediaeval
China. In modern times, the decline of Indian influence and the
resurgence of Confucianism led to the development of modern Chinese
philosophy over a period running from the eleventh century down to the
present. Meanwhile, European thought progressively outgrew the
influence of Judaism, leading to the development of modern European
philosophy. Today, these two major branches, the Chinese and the
western, have met and are influencing one another. It may be that,
fifty or one hundred years from now, we will see the emergence of a
world philosophy, but it is too early to tell.4
Hu Shi's statement on Indian philosophy joining the Chinese system is
excessive; even though it is true that Chinese culture was influenced
by India, his theory that there has been no longer an independent
Indian philosophy is untenable. Actually, what merits attention is
rather the fact that Hu Shi was writing in 1918, right at the time when
the New Culture movement was at its peak. The merging of philosophies
East and West he envisioned did not fit totally with the more radical
views of the day, but later on it proved to be quite close to the
East-meets-West theories of the post-May Fourth period.
***
Altogether Hu Shi did not discuss very much problems of methods.
Actually, he was quite in the dark as to how a history of Chinese
philosophy should be written, and did not probe deeply into the issues
involved. Quite different was Feng Youlan (1895-1990) who published A
History of Chinese Philosophy in the early 30s. Clearly enough, the
superiority of this work over Hu Shi's lay first of all in Feng's
awareness of these matters.
In his opening sentence, Feng Youlan wrote: "Originally,
philosophy is a western word. Whoever wishes to expound the history of
Chinese philosophy must take as one of his first tasks the selection
and exposition of those fields of study in Chinese history which can be
called philosophy in the sense of this term in the West."
However classical this principle may sound, its concrete application
proved to be extremely complex. Feng Youlan, again: "Before setting to work, I must first be clear
about the meaning of the word philosophy. This word has had a long
history in the West and philosophers have not agreed on one definition
of philosophy. For the sake of convenience, let us first describe what
is generally considered to be the content of philosophy; knowing this
content, we will be able to grasp what philosophy is all about, and
there will be no need to further inquire about a formal definition of
the word philosophy itself."5 Then, noting that
philosophy in the West has comprised three major fields of study (a
theory of the world, a theory of life, a theory of knowledge), Feng
commented: "From Plato to the late Middle
Ages these three disciplines have been prevalent, and they have
remained quite important in modern times. To put it briefly, we have
here the content of philosophy."6 Meanwhile, he
added that these three major disciplines could be subdivided: "a theory
of the world" into ontology (a study of the substance of "being" and of
the essentials of "reality") and cosmology (a study of the apparition
of the world, of its history and of its final home-coming); "a theory
of life" into psychology and ethics; "a theory of knowledge" into
epistemology and logics. Unlike Hu Shi, Feng Youlan did not mention the
philosophy of religion, political philosophy and the philosophy of
education--a sign, probably, that he was less influenced by John Dewey
than Hu Shi was.7
Now that the content of "philosophy" had been made clear, it was
possible to decide on a criterion for selecting the materials of a
history of Chinese philosophy. "This
'content' has already determined the scope of philosophy and indicated
the questions pertaining to philosophy. Among the ancient texts, only
those which deal with such questions and contain discussions falling
within the above-mentioned scope, constitute material for the history
of philosophy."8 This is a quite
straightforward answer, but does it totally solve the problem at hand:
the selection of materials for a "history of Chinese philosophy"
Feng Youlan moved on:
From my own understanding of the content of
philosophy outlined above, it is clear that the subject matter of
'philosophy' in the West has been roughly similar to that of what, in
China, was called "learning of the mystery" in the third and fourth
centuries, the "learning of the Way" in the 11th-17th centuries and
"learning of moral principles" in the 17th-19th centuries. [...] The
study of the Way of Heaven was roughly similar to the cosmology of
western philosophy, as was their study of human nature to the
philosophy of life in the West. As for the study of methodology found
in western philosophy, it has been pursued during the founding period
of Chinese intellectual history, but was abandoned from the 11th
century on. Admittedly, we could argue that, then, the study of moral
principles had its own methodology (the "method of self-cultivation"),
but actually this methodology was not aimed at acquiring knowledge, but
at moral improvement.9
This argument is also quite sound. According to Feng, "philosophy" in
the West and the "learning of moral principles" in China are roughly
similar; and, indeed, there are in the old learning of moral principles
a number of elements which are by and large similar to western
cosmology and philosophy of life. Meanwhile, he also points out that
there other elements in the learning of moral principles that do not
correspond to the content of western "philosophy," and this is
particularly true of the "method of self-cultivation" dear to the
Chinese tradition.
As Feng Youlan saw it, we have two options. The one is to hold to the
standards of western "philosophy" and, quite rigorously, extract
whatever in the Chinese learning of moral principles may correspond to
that standard; then, consider these extractions as being "Chinese
philosophy", study them and make them the stuff of "the history of
Chinese philosophy." The other option would be to take the whole array
of the Chinese learning of moral principles as one's only object, study
it and compose a "history of the Chinese learning of moral principles."
One could even go one step further and write a "history of the learning
of moral principles in the West," according to Chinese standards. Of
course, Feng Youlan chose the first option, because in the twentieth
century Chinese scholarship was one with the rest of the world or, one
could say, because this was the century of the western "connection."
Regarding the inadvisability of the second option, he explained:
In principle, this second option is quite
feasible. But, the fact is that modern learning originated in the West,
and first of all modern sciences. If among all the disciplines in the
history of China and of the West we identify one element as learning of
the moral principles, we will find it quite difficult to determine its
exact standing and role among the other modern disciplines. But, if we
identify this common element as philosophy, there is no problem. And,
in fact, in recent years books have appeared on the history of Chinese
philosophy, but none on the history of the learning of moral principles
in the West. Accordingly, in the following pages, I use only the terms
"Chinese philosophy" and "Chinese philosophers." "Chinese philosophy"
means that discipline in China (or a given part of a given discipline)
which can be termed philosophy according to the western usage of the
word. Likewise, "Chinese philosophers" means that sort of scholars in
China who can be called philosophers according to the understanding of
the term in the West.10
In fact, in this discussion the question "How write a history of
Chinese philosophy?" is connected to the question of the standing and
legitimacy of Chinese philosophy as an academic discipline. Hence, with
his formulation, Feng Youlan made it clear that the question of whether
or not to set up a discipline called "Chinese philosophy" brings us to
another question, "Should we set up a discipline called 'Philosophy'"?
Then, ultimately, this question takes us to the question: "Should we
bring in as a whole the academic structure and branches of learning of
the modern West?" Clearly enough, we are no longer dealing only with
the question of how to write a history of Chinese philosophy.
Let's go back to the question above regarding the learning of moral
principles in China: how to handle the disparity between the Chinese
understanding of philosophy and the western one? Since Feng Youlan has
noted that "methodology" meant epistemology in the West, but theory of
self-cultivation in China, the question arises: are all the sayings on
methods of self-cultivation in the Chinese learning of moral principles
to be taken as the objects of research on and exposition of "Chinese
philosophy"? On this issue, Feng has provided no clear answer. He only
wrote:
Because of their special emphasis on human
affairs, Chinese philosophers' study of cosmology and ontology has been
quite sketchy; whereas philosophy in the West has fully developed all
the above-mentioned disciplines, the fact is that Chinese philosophy
was not able to be that thorough. Nevertheless, since Chinese
philosophers put the emphasis on the way of sagehood within, they were
quite thorough in their exposition of methods of self-cultivation. It
may be that the latter cannot be called philosophy, but the fact is
that, in this regard, China has made quite a contribution, indeed.11
On the one hand, Feng Youlan thus admits that "it may be that this
cannot be called philosophy," but on the other hand, in his A History
of Chinese Philosophy he has much to say about methods of
self-cultivation. In other words, even though some of the contents of
the learning of moral principles may have been no correspondent topic
in western philosophy, they still could be entered in a history of
Chinese philosophy.
As we go on, we may actually add a third option to Feng Youlan's two.
We need not follow the strict prescriptions of philosophy in the
western sense; instead, we may simply take the Chinese learning of
moral principles as being "Chinese philosophy." We may add that, after
Feng Youlan, this has been the method of scholars engaged in the study
of the history of Chinese philosophy. On the one hand, at the
theoretical level, they have taken as their standard the contents of
western philosophy; while, on the other hand, in practice, they have
actually adopted the scope of the Chinese learning of moral principles.
Besides, twentieth century's scholars have never expressed any strong
desire to solve fully these theoretical issues.
***
In the late 30s, Zhang Dainian ( - ) wrote his own "An Outline of
Chinese Philosophy." In the very first page of his "Preface," he also
discussed the definition of philosophy and Chinese philosophy:
Definitions of philosophy in the West are
legion, almost each philosopher having his own definition. Actually,
each one of these definitions is only that of one given school, not of
philosophy in general. As a way of summarizing all these views of
philosophy, we could say that philosophy is the discipline that studies
and discusses the ultimate principles of the world and human life, and
the method for understanding those principles."12
Thus, for Zhang Dainian also, the world, human life and methods of
knowing are the hallmarks of philosophy.
Zhang Dainian goes on: "Since Antiquity, China has never had a term
corresponding completely to the meaning of today's 'philosophy'."
Meanwhile, he remarked that the old "learning" before the second
century B.C. and the "learning of the various schools of thought" in
the following centuries are, by and large, similar to today's
"philosophy"; the expression "learning of mystery" in the third and
fourth centuries had roughly the same meaning as to-day's "philosophy";
likewise, from the eleventh century on, the "learning of the Way," "the
learning of principle," or the "learning of moral principles" had
contents quite close to that of "philosophy" today. However, the
"learning of mystery" or the "learning of the Way" had their own
territories: each expression designates one given school of philosophy
or one given type of philosophy. As such, those terms "were not similar
to today's 'philosophy', that is, they were not a general appellation.
And, actually there has never been in the past a general term covering,
say, both the 'learning of mystery' and the 'learning of the Way'."13
> Zhang Dainian, then, volunteered the following: "Could these
various "learnings" in the course of Chinese history be all together
called "philosophy"? May we not call "philosophy" ancient Chinese
reflections and theories on the world and human life? On this issue, we
have to examine our own view of that one word "philosophy." If
"philosophy" designates only western philosophy or if western
philosophy is considered to be the only type of philosophy, then the
fields of study that differ from the approach and method of western
philosophy belong to another discipline, they are not philosophy.
Hence, since the basic approach of Chinese thought is actually
different from that of the West, Chinese learning may certainly not be
called "philosophy." At this point, Zhang Dainian, who does not approve
of this view, raised a very important idea:
We can take "philosophy" as a generic term,
not restricted to western philosophy. In other words, we could say that
it is a category of learning, of which western philosophy is one
specific instance; the generic name of this category of learning is
"philosophy." This way, we may call "philosophy" anything bearing
resemblance with western philosophy and that can fit in this category.
With this understanding of philosophy, nothing prevents us from calling
philosophy the thoughts and theories of the ancient Chinese regarding
the world and human life. Chinese philosophy and western philosophy may
not be similar in their basic approaches; yet, regarding topics and
objects of study as well as its standing among the other fields of
learning, Chinese philosophy is quite equivalent to western philosophy.14
At the end of his "Introduction," Zhang Dainian also noted the
difference between general and special philosophies. Philosophy of
history, political philosophy or aesthetics, all belong to special
philosophy; general philosophy does not include special philosophy, but
specializes in cosmology and ontology, theory of life and epistemology.
In Zhang's "Outline of Chinese philosophy," the term "Chinese
philosophy" refers only to general philosophy, and there is no mention
of the various special philosophies in China. However, exactly like
Feng Youlan, in his study of Chinese philosophy, Zhang Dainian was
unable strictly and thoroughly to apply the standards of western
general philosophy. As he saw it, Chinese philosophers have covered
five branches of learning, with their respective objects: the Way of
Heaven; the Way of man; the extension of knowledge; self-cultivation;
and, political affairs. Of these five branches of learning, Zhang
added, the former three correspond to the theory of the world, theory
of life and methodology of western philosophy; the remaining two
(self-cultivation and political affairs) can be taken as special
philosophy lying outside the scope of general philosophy.15
Thus, according to this division, the theories of self-cultivation must
not be mentioned as "Chinese philosophy", but Zhang Dainian also held
the view that one characteristic of Chinese philosophy was "the unity
of the true and the good", that is to say: Chinese philosophy has never
divorced the search for the True from the pursuit of the Good. For him,
the extension of knowledge and self-cultivation were inseparable; the
quest for the True was identical with the quest for the Good.16 This statement, however, amounts to saying that the
theories on the extension of knowledge and those on self-cultivation
should not be separated--making it impossible to regard the theories of
self-cultivation as "special philosophy" and banish them outside the
scope of "Chinese philosophy."
***
To sum up, it is clear that Zhang Dainian's formulations have validity
and invite further elaboration. In the wake of the large-scale
introduction of western culture in the nineteenth century, Japanese
scholars have created a new word out of two Chinese characters
(tetsu-gaku, in Japanese pronunciation) to translate the foreign word
philosophy and our countrymen have adopted this translation (zhe-xue,
in Chinese pronunciation.)17 This is how the notion
of "Chinese philosophy" came into being. In the modern cultural
development of China, the overall trend has been the wholesale adoption
of the academic classification from the West; China acquired a
modernized academic framework by borrowing these new academic
categories: philosophy, literature, history, law, political science,
etc. The adoption of these academic categories had a four-fold role.
Firstly, the bifurcations on the map of western learning could provide
a coherent understanding of the contents of that learning; secondly, it
was then easier to introduce the western educational system and, on the
basis of these new categories, to set up the academic organization of
the modern Chinese university education; thirdly, this new division of
labour would connect China with the world and underwrite the
development of contemporary Chinese culture; fourthly, the new academic
system would allow Chinese to categorize and put in order their
traditional culture and world of learning.
Be that as it may, compared with the other new disciplines set up in
modern times, the notion of "Chinese philosophy" proved to be quite an
embarrassment. Exactly as indicated by the three authors quoted above,
the most important issue is not whether or not Chinese antiquity had
the word "philosophy", but rather the fact that, among the various
divisions of the old academic set-up, there was no independent system
exactly corresponding to "philosophy" in the West. Admittedly, the
Chinese learning of moral principles constituted a theoretical system
covering the reflections of ancient thinkers about the universe, human
life and the mind; yet, the questions under discussion were not
identical to those debated by western philosophy. This is true, for
example, of those questions debated time and again and so meticulously
between the eleventh and seventeenth centuries (for instance, what was
the role of regular practices such as studying the Classics or
meditation?)--all questions that are different from those of western
philosophy. This is a point which, seemingly, our three authors have
failed to give due attention to; for Feng Youlan, once the content of
philosophy had been determined, you knew what the philosophical
problems were. Likewise, according to Zhang Dainian, Chinese and
western philosophies differed in their approach, but they shared the
same questions and objects. The fact, however, is that both China and
the West have theoretical systems regarding the universe and human
life, but the key problems that structure those systems are different.
In the case of Mainland China, given the intellectual climate of the
1950-1980 period, the Marxist view of the history of philosophy was
that the basic problems were common and this constituted quite an
impediment for those doing research on Chinese philosophy. While,
admittedly, the impact of such views has been progressively phased out
since the early 1980s, there has been no thorough discussion nor
consensus in academic circles as to whether there had been questions
common to Chinese philosophy and western philosophy. Meanwhile,
philosophical circles in the West have long refused to regard Chinese
philosophy as philosophy; for them, Chinese philosophy has not debated
the issues discussed in western philosophy, hence it belongs only to
the study of ideas or religion. This view is essentially a display of
cultural Euro-centrism: on the assumption that the questions studied by
western philosophy are the "philosophical" questions, one decides
whether non-western cultures have philosophy or not.
The ancient Chinese learning of moral principles and western
"philosophy" differ in scope. If we take as our norm the scope of
western "philosophy," proceed to carve out a part of the old learning
of moral principles, and call this part "Chinese philosophy," not only
do we subvert the integrity of the old set-up, but also there are
necessary aspects of this set-up that are left out of "Chinese
philosophy."
I am not saying that those circumstances of Chine culture are beyond
remedy. Zhang Dainian gives us a clue: we ought to regard philosophy as
we regard culture. In other words, "philosophy" is a universal: it is
the general term for the theories and reflections on the universe and
human life in any nation around the world, be it in the West ("western
philosophy"), in India ("Indian philosophy"), in China ("Chinese
philosophy"), etc. In this sense, western philosophy is only one
particular example of philosophy, not its standard. Hence, the word
"philosophy" ought not be taken in the peculiar sense traditional in
the West; instead, it ought to be an all-embracing, general notion
belonging to the many cultures of the world.
In this way, the Chinese learning of moral principles is Chinese
philosophy. Admittedly, its scope and the questions it pursues are
somewhat different from those of western philosophy, but these
differences, far from jeopardizing its status as Chinese philosophy, do
manifest that philosophy is unity of universal and particular.
Accordingly, one main task for non-western philosophers is to develop a
comprehensive notion of "philosophy," promote it around the world, and
thus destructure the West-centered posture in the interpretation of the
notion of "philosophy." Only then will it be possible truly to promote
a supra-cultural philosophical dialogue and develop humankind's
philosophical wisdom in the twenty-first century. Should to-morrow's
understanding of philosophy remain controlled by the European tradition
or, even worse, by the "British and North American analytical"
tradition, thus making it impossible to express the humanistic wisdom
and value orientation of philosophy, then the prospects for mankind in
the twenty-first century will not look better than in the twentieth.
***
From the early 1930s on, researchers on Chinese philosophy have
contributed very little, theoretical or methodological, regarding the
above-mentioned issues. Meanwhile, in their actual work, they have
basically assimilated the scope of "Chinese philosophy" to the old
learning of moral principles; in other words, their delimitation of the
scope of Chinese philosophy was not strictly done according to the
topics of western philosophy. Yet, they did not realize that they
should discuss the division of labor between the "history of Chinese
philosophy" and the "intellectual history of China" or other
disciplines dealing with thought and culture. Consequently, for quite a
long period, and especially in Chinese-language literature, the
distinction has been blurred between research on the history of Chinese
philosophy and research on the intellectual history of China. As a
trend, the latter was overshadowed by the former; closely assimilated
to the history of philosophy, intellectual history could not display
its own identity. For instance, while in the 50s the Research Bureau on
Chinese Intellectual History (Chinese Academy of Social Sciences,
Beijing) published a "General Intellectual History of China" that was
quite strong on political and economic aspects, in the 80s its "History
of Neo-Confucianism in Song-Ming Times (XI-XVIIth centuries)" clearly
reflected the history-of-philosophy approach.
Be that as it may, since the early 80s, the scope of the history of
Chinese philosophy has become more and more blurred, as research on
thought found itself influenced by the development of social history,
socio-intellectual history and cultural history. As professional
researchers in the history of Chinese philosophy were on the brink of
"getting lost", it became once again necessary to tackle the issue of
the scope of Chinese philosophy. The reasons for doing so were new.
Whereas in the 30s Feng Youlan's definitions tended to confine or
reduce Chinese philosophy to the scope of western philosophy, since the
early 80s, that one discipline "Chinese philosophy" was under much
pressure to widen its scope. The trend was no longer the assimilation
of intellectual history to the history of philosophy; now, the history
of philosophy was being drawn into intellectual history and other
historical disciplines. The outcome was a much confused division of
labor between the various research fields dealing with thought and
culture. Admittedly, we are not saying that this is a very critical
situation and that it is found everywhere; yet, this situation does
constitute quite a challenge for the study of Chinese philosophy.
In the United States, in the 60s and 70s, the leading research on
Chinese philosophy or on Chinese thought would emphasize thought and
notions, but, in the 80s this approach was soon under attack and had to
give way to a social history-oriented study of thought and culture.
Since, in the United States, research dealing with Chinese philosophy
is done in East Asian or History departments, not in Philosophy
departments, the influence of historical and social sciences came as no
surprise, and many of the scholars born after the war turned to the new
approach. Their main preoccupation was no longer to grasp ideas,
notions or propositions as such; instead, by placing thought in its
social and cultural environment, they would attempt to identify the
organic link between thought and society, so that their study of ideas
further displayed the approach of historical sciences, and not that of
philosophy. Their aim was to understand the concrete connections
between ideas and society in a given period, not how thinkers in all
periods of history had reflected on and probed into the permanent
topics regarding the universe, human life and the mind. Basically, we
have here two different categories of inquiry, the former belonging to
the study of history, whereas the latter is what the history of
philosophy dedicates itself to.
This trend among scholars in the United States had very little impact
on scholars in China, who had long tasted the sweetness and bitterness
of historical materialism, but it exerted considerable influence in
Japan. Under the leadership of Tôkyô University, the
"Tôkyô School" decisively turned toward this type of
research and, in the early 90s, with the approval of the Ministry of
Education, the old-styled "Research Bureau on Chinese Philosophy" at
Tôkyô University was renamed "Research Bureau for Chinese
Intellectual and Cultural Studies" and the scope of research, much
wider, extended to all aspects of Chinese culture. Likewise, the
"Chinese Philosophy Society" at Tôkyô University was
renamed "Research Society on Chinese Society and Culture". As a matter
of fact, Chinese philosophy has been the discipline with the longest
tradition at the University of Tôkyô and the "Chinese
Philosophy Society" had long been the organization doing research on
China at the University, but today "Chinese philosophy" has already
vanished at this institution. This new orientation at Tôkyô
University has doubtlessly influenced and will continue to influence
the academic circles in Japan. The status of "Chinese philosophy" as a
discipline will necessarily be modified in other universities, most of
all at public universities, and the outcome will be a rapid downsizing
of research on Chinese philosophy.
These days, admittedly, the study of Chinese philosophy continues to
develop around the world. In the United States and in Europe, there is
a gradual increase in the number of scholars, with a background in
philosophy or theology, who are still engaged, and quite successfully,
in the study of the philosophical aspects of Chinese thought. Yet, the
challenge from the fields of intellectual history or intellectual and
cultural studies is beyond dispute. In Japan, and first of all in
private universities, there are still a good number of schools that
list "Eastern Philosophies" as one discipline, but the latter includes
more and more non-philosophical topics (History of Taoist Religion and
Taoist Liturgies, for instance.)
As a matter of fact, East or West, this has long been the trend in
sinological research. In Europe, sinology has traditionally emphasized
philology, theatre and novels, or popular customs as represented by the
Taoist religion; little attention was paid to thought and philosophy.
In Japan, founder of the "Kyôto School" Kano Naoki (1868-1947)
was greatly influenced by the textual criticism of eighteenth century's
China; for him, the history of scholarship was to be regarded as the
history of philosophy.18 Since, in his view, the
"history of scholarship" included philology and historical criticism as
well as research on the traditional study of Confucian classics, his
"History of Chinese Philosophy" devotes much space to the various
approaches to the study of the Confucian classics in the course of
history. In Kano's view, the history of Chinese philosophy should
include all the thinkers of Antiquity, Neo-Confucianism, and
philological and historical research on the Classics.19
Later on, Kano's disciple Kojima Yuma replaced "history of Chinese
philosophy" with "intellectual history of China", on the assumption
that a discipline calling itself "history of Chinese philosophy" would
violate the integrality of Chinese thought. Under the influence of E.
Durkheim's sociology, Kojima entered the history of scholarship and the
history of the study of the Classics into the overall framework of the
history of social thought. For him, thought should be approached from
the viewpoint of the social sciences dealing with politics, economy,
law, and morals.20 And today, writes Sakaide
Shôshin, for the students at the Research Bureau on the History
of Chinese Philosophy, Kyôto University, topics in "Chinese
philosophy" not only include the study of the Classics, Confucianism,
Taoist and Buddhist religions, but also traditional medicine, agronomy,
astronomy, mathematics, and other scientific and technical subjects.
This trend, Sakaide comments, is prevalent in the educational world of
Japan.21 In other words, fewer and fewer are the
Japanese universities that still know of an independent discipline
called the study of Chinese philosophy. They have progressively turned
toward the much broader notion of the study of Chinese culture.
Clearly enough, since the early 90s, European sinology and Chinese
studies in the United States, as well as the "Tôkyô School"
and the "Kyôto School" in Japan have progressively converged.
Everywhere, the study of Chinese thought is identified with social
history, cultural studies, and not with philosophy. Three main causes
account for this trend which affects research on the philosophical
aspects of Chinese thought. First, the appearance of new patterns of
academic research that, as a rule, strive to challenge tradition.
Second, researchers in Chinese philosophy are in excess, and it is
necessary to redistribute properly their capabilities. Third, Chinese
philosophy is a field of study comparatively more difficult than
others; the study of the realm of metaphysics is more complex than that
of this world around us! Besides, we may add, around the planet
interest for philosophy is on the wane; philosophical work is
increasingly under the impact of social sciences, and, among the
latter, historical sciences constitute the most serious temptation and
challenge. Those worldwide transformations in the area of research have
a serious impact on the academic exchange between Chinese and foreign
scholars in the field of Chinese thought and culture, thereby
influencing the study of the history of Chinese philosophy in our
country.
* * *
Obviously, a study of Chinese culture as a whole, or even of Chinese
thought for that matter, would be unbalanced if it devoted excessive
energy to the study of Chinese philosophy. We ought to promote the
study of the many other aspects of Chinese culture; religion, sciences,
geomantic methods, popular customs, are so many topics that require
further study. To achieve this, however, there is no need to widen the
connotation of "Chinese philosophy" (thereby sacrificing the notion of
Chinese philosophy as a discipline.) One may very well do research on
Chinese philosophy and, at the same time, study other aspects of
Chinese culture, without having to forsake the notion of "Chinese
philosophy." Indeed, students of Chinese philosophical thought must
give due consideration to the links between thought and society, but
the study of those links need not be their main task; given a right
division of labor, this study should be left to other specialized
departments or become the object of joint programs. Moreover, this plea
for an urgent development of research in the many areas of Chinese
culture does not amount to saying that there is no longer need to study
the notions, propositions, ideas and systems of Chinese philosophy. In
this regard, works in foreign languages, such as Roger T. Ames' and
David L. Hall's studies of philosophy in ancient Chinese thought, are
still too few.22
In other words, it is necessary to rearticulate clearly the main
assignment of each discipline: "history of Chinese philosophy,"
"intellectual history of China," "history of Chinese scholarship,"
"history of Chinese culture." Let us say that, in terms of scope,
culture is wider than scholarship, scholarship wider than thought,
thought wider than philosophy. (1) Chinese philosophy specifically
denotes the organized system of theoretical reflections and notions
developed by ancient Chinese thinkers, regarding the universe, human
life, the mind and knowledge. In the realm of cultural superstructure,
philosophy is the activity most remote from social actuality. Its
relation to the economic foundation of society is indirect or
indistinct, and maybe it is quite difficult to determine that relation.
(2) The main realm of Chinese intellectual history, then, is
extra-philosophical; it focuses on what does not belong to general
philosophy: the content of political, social, historical ideas, and
trends of thought in society at large. Since the links between these
ideas and the social and economic basis are relatively direct,
intellectual history not only studies ideas, but also the complex
interrelation and interplay between these ideas and the structure and
environment of one given society and culture (including politics,
economy) with a view to understanding the organic connections at work
through society during that period. (3) The history of Chinese
scholarship must embrace all types of areas of learning that ought not
to be the main concern of intellectual historians: pre-modern sciences,
study of the Confucian Classics, geomancy, philology, historical
criticism, traditional lexicography. (4) Much broader, of course, is
research on the history of Chinese culture. Besides covering extensive
ground, it is not limited to studying the ideas and writings of
theoreticians, it also covers folk customs, popular religion, general
attitudes, etc. In conclusion, Chinese philosophy fits better among
philosophical disciplines; Chinese intellectual history, among
historical disciplines; and, the history of Chinese scholarship, in
arts and literature (except for the area of traditional science and
techniques that should be entrusted to specialists of the history of
sciences.) As for the inter-disciplinary study of Chinese culture as a
whole, it should be organized by a research center or a special
committee. Admittedly, broad programs on "Chinese thought and culture"
make sense in foreign universities that can allow only so much room for
Chinese studies. Yet, even then, one needs to be aware of the specifics
of the various fields under the "thought and culture" umbrella; it is
extremely important to understand that these various fields require
different types of intellectual tools. Last, it is likewise important
to bear in mind that the agendas are not the same, that the researcher
in philosophy is mainly concerned with assessing humanistic values,
whereas historians are looking for historical evidence.
A specialist in the history of Chinese philosophy may, indeed,
concurrently study intellectual history or the history of scholarship.
After all, in traditional China fields of learning overlapped and were
never highly divided. Besides, there are, of course, intersections
between these three categories of "history," and, anyhow, many
specialized research topics necessarily bring the specialist onto
someone else's turf.
Be that as it may, a clear understanding of this division of labor will
allow scholars to be clear about their main tasks and prevent
unnecessary arguments. Meanwhile, it should be clear that we do not
intend to build barbed wire fences between these three categories of
"history"; this division of labor should rather allow and encourage
cooperative research. Inter-disciplinary research centers on Chinese
culture must specially promote and organize research on those
borderline topics that are often passed over by the specialist.
1 The first ever "History of
Chinese Philosophy" was written in Japanese by the Japanese scholar
Takase Takejirô, and published in Tokyo in 1911: Shina tetsugaku
shi. In 1916, Xie Wuliang published in Shanghai the first "History of
Chinese Philosophy" in Chinese and by a Chinese: Zhongguo zhexue shi.
Later on, the two major works by Chinese were those quoted here by
Professor Chen Lai: Hu Shi's "An Outline of the History of Chinese
Philosophy- Antiquity" [Zhongguo zhexue shi dagang ], Shanghai, 1918,
and Feng Youlan's "A History of Chinese Philosophy" [Zhongguo zhexue
shi], Shanghai, 1930 & 1934. Feng's two-volume book has been
translated into English by Derk Bodde (Fung Yulan, A History of Chinese
Philosophy, Vol. I, Beijing: Henri Vetch, 1937; Vols. I & II,
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952-53 1952.) Ed.
2 Hu Shi, "An Outline of the
History of Chinese Philosophy" (in Chinese), Vol. I, p. 1
3 Ibid., pp. 1-2
4 Ibid., p. 5
5 Feng Youlan, "A History of
Chinese Philosophy" (in Chinese), Vol. I, p. 1. In this and the
following notes, Professsor Chen Lai quotes Feng's "Introduction" in
the original Chinese. Later on, together with Derk Bodde, Feng wrote
another "Introduction" for the English translation. Ed.
6 Ibid., p.2
7 Both Hu Shi and Feng Youlan
did their graduate work at Columbia University, where J. Dewey was
teaching. Feng, however, moved closer and closer to the views of R.B.
Perry , W.P. Montague, W.B. Pitkin and other "neorealists" who were
mainly based at Columbia and Harvard. Ed.
8 Ibid., p. 25
9 Ibid., p. 7
10 Ibid., p. 8
11 Ibid., p. 11
12 Zhang Dainian, "An Outline
of Chinese Philosophy" (in Chinese), Beijing: China Academy of Social
Sciences, 1982, p. 1
13 Ibid., p. 2
14 Ibid., p. 2
15 Ibid., p. 3
16 Ibid., p. 7
17 Japanese scholar Nishi Amane
(1829-1897) made up the new word. Then, Chinese diplomat and reformer
Huang Zunxian (1848-1905), quoted it in his 1890 book, "A History of
Japan" [Riben guozhi], where he described the various departments at
Japan's first modern university. Starting in 1902, a increasing number
of translations from the Japanese or essays, by Chinese students in
Japan, first introduced "philosophy" to intellectuals in China. Ed.
18 The term "Kyôto
School" first applied to Japan's leading group of philosophers around
Nishida Kitaro (1870-1945) at Kyôto University. Later on, the
term was extended to the Liberal Arts section of the same university,
especially to scholars engaged in sinological research. Here, Chen Lai
refers to these scholars. Ed.
19 Kano Noaki, "History of
Chinese Philosophy" [bbbb testugaku shi], 1967, pp. 4-11
20 Kojima Yuma, "Chinese
Intellectual History" [ goku nbnbnbnb ], 1968, p. 1
21 Sakaido Shôshin, "The
Academic Standing of the Study of Chinese Philosophy in Japan" (in
Japanese), in: "Minutes of the Chinese Literature Society at Kansai
University," No. 19, p. 6
22 See, for instance, David L.
Hall & Roger T. Ames, Thinking through Confucius, New York: New
York State University, 1987; translated into Chinese in 1996 (Nanjing:
Jiangsu People's Press.) Ed.